Fall of France (Part 1)

The interwar period in France proved to be a critical time that laid the groundwork for the nation's stunning defeat in 1940. While the French emerged from World War I victorious, the nation struggled to grapple with political divisions, economic woes, and strategic oversights that would hinder its ability to prepare for the looming threat of another conflict with Germany.

World War I left a profound impact on France, shaping its political, social, and economic landscape in the years leading up to World War II. The northern part of the country, which bore the brunt of the fighting, suffered extensive damage to its infrastructure, cities, and industrial capacity. The human cost was even more staggering: 1.35 million military deaths, representing 4.4% of the population, along with 600,000 civilian deaths, left a gaping hole in French society. These losses not only depleted the nation's manpower but also left a lasting psychological impact, fostering a sense of weariness and aversion to war among many.

Political divisions and military policy

The interwar years were marked by deep political divisions within France, which had significant consequences for its defense policies. Conservative military officers clashed with left-leaning governments over key issues such as conscription and military modernization. The left, wary of potential coups from right-wing officers, favored a smaller professional army supported by short-term conscripts. This approach, coupled with the strong demand for manpower to rebuild the country, led to a reduction of mandatory military service from three years to a mere one year by 1928, raising concerns about the adequacy of training for reservists.

This political climate also influenced France's approach to military technology. While figures like Charles de Gaulle advocated for a professionalized, mechanized army in his 1934 work "Vers l'armée du métier," his ideas were met with suspicion by politicians and the military brass. This mirrored the distrust surrounding similar mechanization efforts in other countries, such as the Red Army's modernization program under Mikhail Tukhachevsky, which was ultimately dismantled during Stalin's purges. The combination of political infighting and strategic uncertainties left the French military struggling to adapt to the evolving nature of warfare.

Compounding these challenges were persistent manpower shortages that plagued the French military throughout the interwar period. By the 1930s, the army was forced to implement "adaptation measures" to cope with its dwindling personnel. The regular army was reduced to 20 divisions operating at only 70% capacity, with the remaining personnel to be filled by reservists. Low turnout for training sessions, coupled with outdated instructional materials and an overemphasis on individual skills over tactical understanding, resulted in poorly prepared reservists.

The situation was further exacerbated by France's extensive colonial commitments. Between 1935 and 1940, a staggering 40% of the French army was deployed overseas, draining the pool of professional soldiers available to train conscripts and reservists within France. This overseas deployment, driven by the need to maintain order in France's vast colonial empire, diverted vital resources and expertise from the task of preparing for a potential European conflict.

France's strategic thinking during the interwar period was heavily influenced by the traumatic experience of World War I. Determined to avoid a repeat of the devastating trench warfare that had ravaged its territory, France invested heavily in the construction of the Maginot Line, a massive system of fortifications along its border with Germany. Largely completed by 1934, construction had cost over five billion francs between 1930 and 1936, representing 1.6% of the state budget. Critics pointed out inherent weaknesses in the line's design, leading to continuous additions and modifications that further strained the budget. Moreover, the focus on the Maginot Line arguably diverted resources and attention away from other critical areas of military development, such as modernizing equipment and training for mobile warfare.

Economic challenges and the arms industry

The interwar period was also a time of economic turbulence for France, marked by the Great Depression and its lingering effects. The economic downturn had a significant impact on the nation's ability to rearm effectively. Between 1919 and 1934, a mere 12% of military spending was allocated to procuring new equipment. General Maxime Weygand, a prominent military figure, warned in 1932 that continuing on this path risked reducing the army to a "facade."

The procurement practices of the French military further hindered the development of its arms industry relative to Germany. Short-term procurement programs, driven by concerns about high costs, discouraged long-term planning and investment by defense contractors. Delays in payments and a lack of transparency in cost verification exacerbated tensions between the military and the arms industry, creating an environment of mistrust and inefficiency.

The Popular Front and rearmament efforts

Despite these challenges, the Popular Front government, which came to power in 1936, initiated significant rearmament programs aimed at modernizing the French military. Contrary to Vichy propaganda that later accused the Popular Front of weakening France's defenses, military spending actually increased substantially during this period, rising from 13 billion francs in 1935 to a staggering 93 billion francs in 1939, representing 23% of GDP. These programs focused on acquiring modern tanks, aircraft, and other vital equipment. However, production initially lagged behind due to the years of neglect and the lingering effects of the economic depression. By 1938, industrial production was still only 75% of its 1929 levels.

The Popular Front government also undertook a controversial program of nationalizing key industries, including arms manufacturers like Renault, which held a near-monopoly over military vehicle production. The goals of this nationalization program were multifaceted: to consolidate defense manufacturing, curb perceived war profiteering, and streamline procurement processes. However, the move faced stiff resistance from some industrialists, who viewed it as an encroachment on their private interests. Companies like Brandt and Schneider engaged in litigation, slowdowns, and sabotage to thwart the State's efforts, favoring their own interests above the very survival of the French Republic.